Battle of Ligny

Prelude
That Napoleon had surprised both of his opponents was not in doubt. Of the two allied generals, it was Blucher who reacted in a more decisive manner to the French invasion, rushing his forces forward to meet the French advance for he hated the French and more especially Napoleon, and he was eager to come to blows with the enemy. His actions were dictated by his impetuous nature, his hatred of the French which had festered since Prussia's humiliation after Napoleon's blitzkrieg conquest of his homeland in 1806. He was also eager to adhere to his end of the bargain by linking up with the forces of the Duke of Wellington, whom he liked and trusted most implicitly.( To the dismay of many of his generals)

Wellington himself however, had been slow to react, refusing to fully commit himself to any decisive action before he could dismiss his own fears that reports of the French attack through Charleroi might be merely a feint, the real blow falling through Mons. If the main French attack did pierce through Mons, Wellington feared that his supply lines and indeed  his line of retreat to the channel reports might be cut off. Only during the early hours of the 16th, did he at last accept that the whole of the French army had in fact centred upon Charleroi and he gave orders for his forces to concentrate at Quatre Bras. In his own words, Wellington had been 'humbugged' and his inaction lost the allies crucial time to effect a union. Wellington's tardy response had therefore placed the Prussian  army in a unenviable position, for Blucher, with no significant support from his ally, was dangerously racing into the arms of Napoleon's main force. As already stated above, Wellington had sent orders to his various army commanders urging them to march with all haste to Quatre Bras to fulfil his obligations to the Prussians, but concentrating them in force would obviously take time.

During the early hours of the 16th, Napoleon became aware of the growing concentration of Prussian forces in the vicinity of Ligny. Arriving to appraise the strategic situation for himself, he surveyed the the Prussian positions from the Naveau windmill at Fleurus and judged that he was facing the bulk of the Prussian army. He realised that a great opportunity to decisively defeat and perhaps even knock the Prussian's out of the campaign altogether presented itself. Confident that Marshal Ney would have little difficulty in brushing aside Wellington's scattered forces to gain the strategically important crossroads of Quatre Bras, Napoleon envisaged that Ney would then be ideally placed to make a decisive flank attack upon the exposed Prussian right which allied to his own attack would destroy and knock the Prussian army out of the campaign. ' If Ney carries out my orders thoroughly, not a gun of the Prussian army will get away: it will be taken in the very act,' Napoleon told his staff. By 1:00 pm however, Napoleon had become concerned about the inexplicable lack of gunfire from Quatre Bras which prompted him to send of a curt, handwritten note commanding him to ' attack without further delay, all that is before you with the greatest impetuosity' By 2:00pm, Napoleon enlarged upon this note, telling Ney that he should ' '... attack whatever force is before you, and after vigorously driving it back, you will turn in our direction, so as to bring about the envelopment of the Prussian army.' '

The Rival Armies
The Prussian army held a defensive position along a seven mile front along the marshy banks of the Ligny Brook. Although this was a minor obstacle in itself, it must be pointed out  that crossing in the face of enemy fire holding the opposing banks, would present difficulties as would the marshy ground. The Prussian position took advantage of three strongpoints of Ligny  which dominated the centre left along with St Amand in the centre  and Wagnele, upon which the Prussian right flank hinged. These strongpoints would act as breakwaters to disrupt any French attack. Ziethen's I Corps had the  honor of holding these three strongpoints with some 32,000 men. Directly behind Ziethen's position, a massed battery was placed on the slopes leading up towards the Mill of Bussy and Brye, where the Prussians had located their field headquarters. Any French assault piercing Ligny or St Amand, would have to face the formidable counter fire of this battery. The Corps of Pirch II stood poised in support behind Ziethen ready to reinforce and feed in troops to hold the front defences. Finally, Thielemann's III Corps covered the far Prussian left. They protected the Prussian lines of supply and communications which ran to Namur. To hold his poistion, Blucher fielded 84,000 troops and 224 guns.

In all, it was a formidable defensive position which would be a tough nut to crack. The Prussian's took advantage of every available piece of cover, natural or otherwise. The Duke of Wellington riding over to visit Blucher at about 1:00 pm is supposed to have voiced misgivings on some of the Prussian positions which he thought rather exposed, pointing out the advantages that might be gained by utilising more cover. Gneisenau, who disliked Wellington somewhat is reputed to have riposted that the Prussian troops liked to have a more plain view of the enemy! Before he left for Quatre Bras, Wellington promised that he would bring over part of his army, adding ' provided I am not attacked myself'  As we have seen, Wellington was in no position to make such rash promises with his army strung out on the march and in disarray.

Napoleon arrived at Fleurus at 11:00 am amid hearty cries of 'Vive l' Empereur' from his troops who were eager to fight. Napoleon ordered his sappers to build a observation platform around the mill at Fleurus from which he observed the gradual build up of enemy troops. Soon he was convinced that far from facing one Corps or a strong enemy rearguard, he was in fact facing the bulk of the Prussian army. Whilst the Prussians concentrated their strength, Napoleon did likewise and by 2:30 pm he had 68,000 men and 210 guns. This was somewhat weaker than the numbers the Prussians fielded, but then again the French troops were of a higher calibre, and they were in the highest spirits, eager to fight and erase the humiliating defeats of 1813-14 and to prove themselves before the gaze of their Emperor. Finally of course, Napoleon had his trump card, the Imperial Guard standing in reserve to deliver the killing blow once the Prussian army had been sufficiently weakened.

The majority of Napoleon's cavalry were deployed on the french right flank facing the Prussian held villages of Boignee and Balatre. Exelmans and pajol's cavalry corps would here perform the role of pinning Thielemann's III corps in place, Whilst Vandamme and Gerard's III and IV corps would directly assault the Prussian positions of St-Amand and Ligny which dominated the enemy centre. Between them, Vandamme and Gerard deployed seven infantry divisions with Vandamme also utilising a cavalry division on his left. This attack upon the heavily fortified enemy centre promised to be brutal and bloody. Taking up position near to Fleurus in reserve was the Imperial Guard.

The Battle
At around 2:00 pm, the sound of a cannonade from the direction of Quatre Bras, indicated that Marshal Ney had commenced battle. Half an hour later at 2:30 pm, Napoleon ordered his artillery to fire three salvo's which signalled the start of the battle.